When Is Homestead Title Marketable? by Lankton, Milton C.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 11 Article 4 
June 2021 
When Is Homestead Title Marketable? 
Milton C. Lankton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Milton C. Lankton, When Is Homestead Title Marketable?, 28 Dicta 415 (1951). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
WHEN IS HOMESTEAD TITLE MARKETABLE?
MILTON C. LANKTON *
When a husband alone conveys homestead property to his wife
and the wife later conveys it to a third person without the husband
joining in the conveyance, is the title marketable? Although some
Colorado attorneys do not approve titles which depend upon a con-
veyance of homestead property from one spouse to the other in
which the other did not join, an examination of the applicable
Colorado statute would seem to indicate little justification for this
stand. The statute provides :'
To convey or encumber a homestead, both the hus-
band and wife must execute a conveyance of their respec-
tive interests therein. Such conveyance or encumbrance
may be one instrument in writing signed by both husband
and wife or by their separate instruments in writing,
and no special form of acknowledgment other than the
form specified by this article should be necessary ...
Both the language of the statute itself and the court decisions,
discussed hereafter, would indicate that a quitclaim deed from the
husband to the wife conveys the husband's right, title, and interest
in the homestead property, and the wife's subsequent conveyance
to a third person conveys her interest in the property. Both have
conveyed "their respective interests therein" by their "separate
instruments in writing." The 1947 amendment to this section did
not change the applicable part of this statute.2
Prior to the enactment of this statute the owner of homestead
property could convey by deed absolute whether his spouse joined
or not.3 There is no Colorado authority directly in point; however,
in the case of Wise v. Thomas,4 the court said:
... the requirement is that 'both husband and wife' must
execute conveyance, failing which, as the authorities we
have reviewed make plain, a conveyance . . . executed
only by the wife, necessarily is ineffective and void.
Unless carefully analyzed, the language of the court is mis-
leading. The conveyance of one spouse to a third person would
clearly be valid under the statute if the other spouse subsequently
executed a conveyance to the same person. In such a case the con-
veyance by the wife is validated by the husband's subsequent con-
Veyance. If the wife's conveyance were void, it could' never be
validated. It is obvious that the supreme court merely meant that
her conveyance was ineffective, or voidable, as long as the husband
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 40, § 119 (1935). This statute was adopted in 1927.
'CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 40, § 119 (1950 Supp.).
'Wright v. Wittick, 18 Colo. 54, 31 P. 490 (1892); Drake v. Root, 2 Colo.
685 (1875).
4117 Colo. 376, 188 P. 2d 444 (1947).
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did not convey his interest. The annotation to this statute in the
1950 supplement to the Colorado Statutes is likewise misleading.
Nowhere in the annotation does it indicate that the husband in
the Wise case did not convey his interest to anyone. It must be
assumed that the language used in the Wise case was directed solely
toward consideration of the problem there presented, and it is of
little help in an attempt to solve the present problem.
AUTHORITY FROM OTHER STATES
In the absence of a Colorado case in point, decisions in other
states may be of value. Authorities in most states hold that when
homestead property is conveyed from one spouse to the other spouse,
joinder or consent is unnecessary, and decisions in those states which
declare such conveyances ineffective may be easily distinguished. An
examination of the statutes of those states reveals that our statute
is unique in that it permits the conveyance of the "respective in-
terests" of the husband and wife to be executed by "their separate
instruments in writing." The usual requirement is that homestead
property may not be conveyed unless the conveyance is "executed
and acknowledged by both husband and wife."' The decisions in
other states construing provisions of this type clearly show this
differenceA
In Florida, a conveyance from one spouse to the other is invalid
whether the conveyance is made directly from one spouse to the
other or indirectly by a deed from both husband and wife to a third
person and an immediate conveyance is made from the third person
to the wife. 7 The Florida decisions are based on Article 10, §1,
which provides:
§ 1 . . . [The homestead] real estate shall not be
alienable without joint consent of the husband and wife,
when that relation exists.
The Florida law differs from our statute in that it requires
joint consent. However, the real basis for the Florida decisions
seems to be the fact that the benefits of the homestead "inure to
the widow and heirs" of the husband.8 When there were no chil-
dren, a conveyance from the husband to the wife was declared
effectual although the wife did not join in the conveyance. 9
There are decisions under California law in which a convey-
ance or encumbrance from one spouse to the other was declared
ineffective to pass title. In Feirmuth v. Steigleman 10 the wife mort-
' CALIF. CIVIL CODE, § 1242.
6 In construing Code § 1242, the supreme court of California said that al-
though the statute does not use the term "jointly" or "concurrently," it means
that homesteads cannot be conveyed by separate instruments separately exe-
cuted by husband and wife. Hart v. Church, 126 Calif. 471, 58 P. 910 (1899).
'Fla. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Winn, 30 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1947) ; Church
v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931) ; Norton v. Baya, 102 So. 361 (Fla. 1924).
'FLA. CONST., Art. 10, 52.
9Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co., 80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920).
11130 Calif. 392, 62 P. 615 (1900).
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gaged homestead property to her husband the husband subse-
quently assigned the mortgage to a third person. The California
court held the mortgage from wife to husband invalid. The applic-
able California statute provided that the homestead of a married
person could not be encumbered or conveyed unless the instrument
of encumbrance or conveyance were "executed and acknowledged
by both husband and wife."'" Since "both husband and wife" did
not join in the mortgage, the court said the requirement of the
statute had not been fulfilled; the court went on to say that since
the husband could not convey to himself, the mortgage between
husband and wife would be void even if "both husband and wife"
had joined. An earlier California decision indicated that a deed
from husband to wife of homestead property would vest legal title
in the wife, but that the homestead right would still be reserved
tothe husband for his life.
12
CONVEYANCE FROM ONE SPOUSE To THE OTHER
An early Iowa decision also held that a conveyance by a hus..
band to his 'wife "may have operated to vest in the wife legal title
to the property. But the property continued still to be the homestead
of the family", and a subsequent deed from the wife to a third
person was held ineffective as against the husband's right to the
homestead premises.1 3 This case may also be distinguished from
any arising under the Colorado statute, for the Iowa law denied
the validity of a conveyance by the owner of homestead property
"unless the husband and wife, if the owner is married, concur in
and sign the same joint instrument"." Ignoring the difference in
the statutory restrictions, the Iowa case is still of little weight for
subsequent decisions under the same statute -ignore the earlier
case.", In Beedy v. Finney,'6 the Iowa court upheld the validity of
a warranty deed from husband to wife of his homestead property
even though the wife did not join.
In Vermont, where a husband alone quitclaimed to a third
person his homestead property and the third person immediately
conveyed to the wife, no title passed. 7 Of course in the Vermont
case there was not a direct conveyance from husband to wife, but
the main basis for distinguishing this case lies in the fact that the
Vermont statute provides that the husband may not convey his
homestead property "unless his wife joins in the execution and
acknowledgments of such conveyance.""
The Illinois supreme court has said that conveyances of home-
" CALIF. CIVIL CODE, § 1242.
: Burkett v. Burkett, 78 Calif. 310, 20 P. 715 (1889).
3 Spoon v. Van Fossen, 63' Iowa 494, 5 N. W. 624 (1880).
"IOWA CODE, § 1990 (1873).
'
5
Beedy v. Finney, 118 Iowa 276 (1902); Harsh v. Griffith, 72 Iowa 608, 34
N. W. 441 (1887).
"Supra, n. 15.
Ellingwood v. Ellingwood, 91 Vt. 134, 99 A. 781 (1917).
sVT. P. S., § 2553 (1906); P. L. VT., § 2568 (1923).
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stead property between spouses without joinder are invalid.1" In
the leading case of Kitterlin v. Mech. Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany,20 the husband alone conveyed his homestead property to his
wife by quitclaim deed. When the question arose whether or not
the husband had violated the provision of an insurance policy that
the property was not to be transferred without the consent of the
insurance company, the court held that there was no violation of
the restrictive provision of the insurance policy, for the deed from
husband to wife was invalid. In subsequent cases the Illinois court
followed this decision in construing the statute. In Gillam v.
Wright,2 1 title to the homestead premises was in the wife. She
alone conveyed by quitclaim deed to the husband. When the heirs
of the wife sued for partition and the heirs of the husband de-
fended on the basis of the deed from wife to husband, the court
declared the deed invalid as failing to meet the statutory require-
ments of joinder.
The Illinois statute, under which these decisions were rendered,
provided that no conveyance of homestead property should be
valid unless the conveyance were "subscribed by said householder
and his or her wife or husband, if he or she have one, and ac-
knowledged in the same manner as conveyances of real estate are
required to be acknowledged. .. ,,2 The conveyance, in Illinois,
must be "subscribed" and "acknowledged"; thus, separate convey-
ances such as are permitted in Colorado are prohibited. The law of
Illinois required a specific release of the homestead right, and no
waiver or release of the right of homestead "shall bind the wife
unless she join in such release or waiver".
2 3
Thus, cases which have held a conveyance by one spouse to the
other without joinder to be ineffective are no authority for a situ-
ation arising under the Colorado law, for the statutes under which
such decisions were rendered called for a strict observance of the
requirement that both husband and wife must join in the same
instrument. Even were these decisions considered, it is doubtful
that they would be very persuasive. Decisions in other states,
under similar statutes, are not in accord.
MOST STATES Do NOT HAVE STRICT REQUIREMENT OF JOINDER
The better and more logical view would seem to be that
adopted by a majority of the states. In a Texas case,24 the husband
alone conveyed homestead property to the wife and child by quit
claim deed. The wife subsequently conveyed the property by a
warranty deed to a third person without joinder. The Texas court
"Barto v. Kellog, 289 I1. 528, 124 N. E. 633 (1919); Gillan v. Wright, 246
Il. 398, 92 N. E. 906 (1910); Lininger v. Helpenstell, 229 Ill. 369, 82 N. E. 306
(1907); Kitterlin v. Mech. Mut. Ins. Co., 134 Ill. 647, 25 N. E. 772 (1890).
20 Supra, n. 19.
21 Supra, n. 19.
22 SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. ANN., C. 52, 54.
2' SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. ANN., C. 30, § 26.
' Martin v. Barnum, 286 S. W. 550 (Tex. 1926).
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held that title vested in the third person in spite of the Texas
statute requiring that no homestead be conveyed without the con-
sent of the wife evidenced by her "joining in the conveyance, and
signing her name thereto, and by her separate acknowledgment
* . .'"-*2 The reasoning of this decision is that the provision requir-
ing joinder is applicable only in regard to conveyances to third
persons, there being no reason to demand that the wife join in a
conveyance to herself. The reasoning in the Texas case is similar
to that used in Arkansas " under a similar statute.2 7 In Kin'dlay
v. Spraker,"-'s the court quoted with approval Thompson on Home-
stead and Exemptions, § 473:
The policy of these statutes, which restrain the
alienation of the homestead without the wife joining in
the deed, is to protect the wife and enable her to protect
the family in the possession and enjoyment of a home-
stead, after one has been acquired by the husband. They
are not intended to interpose obstacles in the way of a
conveyance of the homestead to the wife, or to the wife
and children, with the consent and approval of the wife,
whatever miay be the form of such conveyance.
In a recent Oklahoma case,2 9 the husband conveyed his home-
stead property. to his wife without her joining. The conveyance
was declared valid even though the statute provided that no deed
of homestead property was valid unless it was "subscribed by both
husband and wife . . I
Although the Michigan statute p-kovides that the husband's
deed to homestead property is not valid unless signed by the wife,
3 'where the husband conveyed -his homestead property to his wife
without joinder, and the wife subsequently conveyed to a third
person, the court held that the conveyances were valid, stating:32
It is insisted that the deed from the husband to his
wife is void, because she did not join in the deed. The
statute does not prevent the husband from conveying his
interest in the homestead to his wife by deed. To require
a deed from herself to herself would be senseless. But
the question is settled in this state against the plaintiff's
contention.
In Missouri the husband is "debarred" from alienating home-
,VERON S CIVIL SrAT., Art. 1115 (1914).
16Polk v. Stephens, 126 Ark. 159, 189 S. W. 837 (1916); Kindly v. Spraker,
72 Ark. 228, 79 S. W. 766.
§ 3901, Kirby's Digest provides: "No conveyance . . . affecting the home-
stead of any married man shall be of any validity . . . unless the wife joins in
the execution of such instrument and acknowledges the same."
21 Supra, n. 26.
-'Howard v. Standard Oil & Gas Co., 169 P. 2d '737 (Okla. 1946).
1116 OKLA. STAT.'A.NN., § 4.
lConP. L. MIcH., c. 623, § 74 (1948). "
"Lynch v. Doran, 95 Mich. 395, 54 N. W. 780 (1893).
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stead property, and any attempted conveyance is declared "null
and void" unless he and his wife jointly convey, 3 3 but a conveyance
from husband to wife without joinder was held valid in Hall v.
Hall.
3 4
PURPOSE OF STATUTES CONSIDERED
In the construction of any statute, the general policy upon
which it is based must be examined in order that the intent of the
legislature be given proper effect. In the present situation, a study
of the homestead statute as a whole and the decisions based on
the statute are of particular value. First, it should be noted that
homestead statutes are not in derogation of the common law and
hence are liberally construed."", The general purpose of the home-
stead exemption is to place the designated property out of the reach
of creditors so long as it is occupied as a home.
3 6
This, of course, is based upon the more general policy of the
state to encourage and protect the family, the institution upon which
our very civilization is founded. In order further to protect the
family, the legislature restricted the manner in which the home-
stead property might be conveyed, in order that one spouse might
not be able to convey homestead property without regard to the
rights of the other. It is generally required that both release their
right in some manner before homestead property may be conveyed.
Thus, the family home is protected against creditors from without,
and treachery within. Not only is the owner protected, but also his
spouse receives protection. As long as the protection which the
statute is designed to give is exacted, the statute is serving its
purpose. Thus, when both spouses join to convey homestead prop-
erty, both knowingly release their rights therein. In the same
manner, when one spouse conveys to the other, he has knowingly
released his interest. There is little point in requiring the grantee
to join in this conveyance for his or her interest is fully protected,
the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled, and no other function
remains to be served. It is a settled principle that a person cannot
be a grantee and a grantor at the same time.
Was it the purpose of the statute to prohibit a conveyance from
one spouse to the other? The requirement in some statutes that
both must join obviously was intended to be applied when the
homestead property was conveyed to a third person.3 7 Joinder
would be absurd when the conveyance is from one spouse to the
other.
Very probably, it was precisely this reasoning that led the
"Mo. REV. STAT., § 608 (1929).
346 Mo. 1217, 145 S. W. 2d 752.
Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 P. 747 (1884).
Helkey v. Ashley, 113 Colo. 175, 155 P. 2d 143 (1945); Woodward v. Peo-
ple's Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. App. 369, 31 P. 184 (1892).
31 Beedy v. Finney, supra, n. 15.
DICTA
Nov., 1951
Illinois legislature to end the series of decisions in Illinois, insist-
ing upon a construction of the statute clearly not intended. In
1919 an amendment was made to the statute requiring joinder
when homestead property was conveyed :-
... provided that where a conveyance is made by a hus-
band to his wife, or by a wife . . . to her husband, such
conveyance shall be effectual to pass the title expressed
therein to be conveyed thereby whether the grantor in
such conveyance is joined therein by such wife or husband
as the case may be or not.
The view of the Illinois Courts prior to the enactment of the
present statute was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United
States as early as 1901. After adopting the view that when the
husband conveyed homestead property to the wife, the conveyance
was valid, even though a statute :39 provided that both husband and
wife must join by signing the instrument of conveyance, it said :-o
The contrary has been held by the Supreme Court
of Illinois in Kitterlin v. Mil. Ins. Co., but the reasoning
of the other cases we think is the better...
Fortunately, in Colorado, the statute requires only that both
husband and wife must convey their respective interests, and it
expressly permits these conveyances to be executed separately.
Thus, the problem becomes less difficult. Those few states which
felt forced to declare conveyances from husband to wife ineffective
without joinder did so because they could not bring themselves to
go beyond the literal interpretation of statutes which made joinder
an absolute necessity. Colorado may adopt the better reasoning
of the other decisions without ever departing from a literal inter-
pretation of her statute.
In the situation confronting us, the granting spouse has con-
veyed his interest to the other spouse; the other spouse then con-
veys to a third person. Both have conveyed all the interest they
have in the premises. Even if the conveyance is a quit claim deed,
the grantor conveys all his right, title and interest. The convey-
ances are separate, and perhaps executed at different times, but
this is permissible under our statute. It would seem to make little
difference whether the husband or the wife is the original grantor,
for both are equally protected, and equally restricted under the
statute.
A marketable title results. The problem as to marketability
is, of course, the important one. Usually, for one reason or an-
other,41 it is fairly clear that the title is "safe." The problem arises
when a prospective purchaser must be convinced of this fact.
The problem also need seldom arise where the conveyance in
a SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. A--.. C. 52, § 4; L. 1919, p. 590, § 1.
ARIz. REv. STAT., § 226 (1887).4'Luhrs v. Hancock, 181 U. S. 567 (1901).
11 Abandonment which cannot be proved is probably most common.
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question appears very far back in the chain of title. The seven year
statute of limitations in Colorado 42 is effective even where the
"color of title" relied upon is a "void" deed. Adverse possession
vests title absolutely after 18 years.
But, in the interim, it is our contention that where one spouse
has conveyed his or her homestead to the other, and the grantee
spouse later coveys to a third person, the title is marketable.
JUNIOR BAR SPONSORS STATE WIDE LEGAL AID
At a meeting held in the Broadmoor Hotel on October 27th,
the Junior Bar Section of the Colorado Bar Association gave con-
sideration to a resolution of the Junior Bar Conference of the
American Bar Association favoring promotion and organization
of Legal Aid Societies and Lawyer Reference Plans.
In order to meet possible future thr~ats of socialization of the
legal profession, the American Bar Association and forward look-
ing attorneys feel that complete legal services 'must, be rendered to
all members of our society regardless of, financial status, race or
creed.
The Junior Bar Section therefore adopfed as its paramount
function at the present time the promotion of such plans in com-
munities where there is found to be a need for such. programs.
Committees were appointed by the section to study the needs of
various c mmunities throughout the state and to further consider
methods of establishing Legal Aid programs and Lawyer Refer-
ence Plans for persons of limited or modeiate means.
Representatives of the Junior Bar wi-ll later request hearings
by Local Bar Associations as the Section plans to place no pro-
grams in operation without the prior advice and approval of the
local Bar.
At this meeting the Junior Bar Section also elected John W.
Patterson of Denver, Chairman, Ben T. Delahay of Colorado
Springs, Vice-Chairman, and Thomas M. Smart of Denver, Secre-
tary-Treasurer for the forthcoming year.
BOOK TRADERS CORNER
Attorneys Kempf & Icke of Montrose, Colorado offer for sale
volumes 1 to 72 of Corpus Juris with annotations from 1937 to
1949. Also offered are volumes 218 to 226, inclusive, of the Pacific
Reporter, Second Series.
'CCoLo. STAT. A.N ., C. 40, § 143 (1935).
Munro v. Eshe, 113 Colo. 19, 156 P. 2d 700 (1944); Parker v. Betts, 47
Colo. 428, 107 P. 816 (1910).
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